Let them Eat Cake!
It is my opinion that the Department of Defense has become an over-bloated top heavy organization. As an organization the military is unable to nimbly react to new and developing threats. Instead, the default position is to set up a new office, a new command, a new organization within the hierarchical structure to deal with the specific threat. Yet, except in very rare cases like the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command, these new organizational structures continue even if they can be folded elsewhere. And in the case of Joint Forces Command, the senior officials and offices were farmed out to other organizations.
We are seeing an evolution in warfare where adversaries are small, mobile forces that use a mix of conventional, unconventional, terrorist, and cyber tactics to achieve specific objectives or a stalemate in a limited operational environment. So how does the U.S. Government (USG) combat these new and developing threats? Well let's take a look at a specific example. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) were a significant force multiplier for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and terrorists in Iraq. IEDs were causing significant U.S. casualties in the mid-2000s. So to counter IEDs, the Department of Defense created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) which is now a combat support agency (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency - JIDA).
So in a time of declining federal budgets and a need growing need for a nimble force structure, instead of transitioning the military from a Cold War relic to an expeditionary force that is dependent on more junior enlisted, junior officers, and NCOs, the DoD decided it needed to create a new agency that, for the most part, is focused on a single threat mode. It is an example of over-bloated bureaucracy. JIDA has three general officers plus whatever support staffs. You cannot tell me, that the capabilities and mission of JIDA would not be better served as a part of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Looks like a landing spot for more general officers.
The next Secretary of Defense needs to take drastic measures and eliminate the bloat or in business parlance, right size the force. What that really means is to radically cull the general officer corps. JIDA is an example of redundancy upon redundancy that creates too many general officer and staff billets to support a decreasing number of combat, combat support, and combat service support troops. This concept is nothing new, there have been initiatives by former Secretaries of Defense (Gates and Hagel) to decrease the number of general officers but out of self preservation that has not happened. Need a new Secretary of Defense with big cajones that will take on the general officer corps and instead of decreasing troop strength, eliminate general officer and staff numbers.
Make no mistake, general officers serve a significant function in a military organization but it is the proliferation of general officer billets to allow for more promotion opportunities across the officer corps that is disconcerting. The backbone of the U.S. military, the NCO Corps, has not seen the explosion in number of junior and mid-ranked NCO billets. The conversation about cuts in defense structure is focused on lower enlisted, NCO, and officer ranks - you know the actual people who are trigger pullers and execute the missions these generals devise.
Unfortunately, the overall number of general officers is not the only issue but each general officer billets increases the number of corresponding support staff. So the number of military members who execute the missions is sacrificed on the alter of increased bureaucracy. And it is this increased bureaucracy that has weighed down the military and driven up the cost with no discernible benefit.
A culling of general officers will upset the power structure. From my vantage point the general officer ranks will want to preserve their own and senior officers will want the ability to continue with a bloated structure that they can move into over time. But this is not a popularity contest. The military is in the throws of a genuine battle over force structure, mission sets, and future threats. If there has ever been a time for a real military transformation, to ensure long term superiority on the battle field, this is the time to make those decisions. Remember, the U.S. military's mission is to win the Nation's wars not to staff actions or create a hierarchical structure unrivaled since the Roman times.
The world is a hell of a lot more complicated than any time in U.S. military history. Current and future warfare will continue to be conducted in a non-static operating environment. The great adversary is a myth in today's geopolitical world. Yes, the Chinese have increased their military prowess and are openly competing with the United States for primacy in the Pacific; but it would be suicidal to believe that the Chinese would directly engage in the U.S. in open combat. Both countries' economic interests are intricately intertwined. Open warfare would wreck havoc and destabilize the world's two largest economies plunging the world into an intractable economic depression. And an economic downturn would be the last thing the Chinese Communist Party wants because that provides a compelling reason for the Chinese population to rebel and thrown off the yoke of communism.
Warfare in the future will continue to be a series of conflicts against: irregular forces; a mix of special forces, limited conventional forces, and insurgents; or terrorist organizations with projection into the homeland. Threats and tactics will continue to evolve and outside of very limited scenarios, warfare will move towards small unit action and irregular warfare. This tactical environment requires a nimble force, with decentralized decision making and a level of autonomy for mission success. This environment does not favor a pantheon of general officers and their staffs to roam the halls of the five sided puzzle palace. Instead, the current headquarters heavy bureaucracy is reminiscent of the vast military structure created to repel the Soviet hordes during the Cold War.
In my own experience, most positions in which general officers fill are over-categorized. An O6 can fill the vast majority of the one star billets. Hell when I served in the U.S. Army, an O6 was the closest thing to a god. "The old man" was the senior leader visible to the troops, who directed our lives and was who we, as junior officers, looked up to for guidance and as an example. The majority of my interactions with general officers have come after I left the military and away from the troops. The DOD needs to adapt and become a nimble, lean force or die under the weight of the bureaucracy.
So where are the cuts coming from, who will stick their neck out to take on the general officer corps? I dare say it will not be this Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is time to look at the current, near term, and long term threats and to develop an agnostic requirements assessment.
We are seeing an evolution in warfare where adversaries are small, mobile forces that use a mix of conventional, unconventional, terrorist, and cyber tactics to achieve specific objectives or a stalemate in a limited operational environment. So how does the U.S. Government (USG) combat these new and developing threats? Well let's take a look at a specific example. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) were a significant force multiplier for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and terrorists in Iraq. IEDs were causing significant U.S. casualties in the mid-2000s. So to counter IEDs, the Department of Defense created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) which is now a combat support agency (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency - JIDA).
So in a time of declining federal budgets and a need growing need for a nimble force structure, instead of transitioning the military from a Cold War relic to an expeditionary force that is dependent on more junior enlisted, junior officers, and NCOs, the DoD decided it needed to create a new agency that, for the most part, is focused on a single threat mode. It is an example of over-bloated bureaucracy. JIDA has three general officers plus whatever support staffs. You cannot tell me, that the capabilities and mission of JIDA would not be better served as a part of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Looks like a landing spot for more general officers.
The next Secretary of Defense needs to take drastic measures and eliminate the bloat or in business parlance, right size the force. What that really means is to radically cull the general officer corps. JIDA is an example of redundancy upon redundancy that creates too many general officer and staff billets to support a decreasing number of combat, combat support, and combat service support troops. This concept is nothing new, there have been initiatives by former Secretaries of Defense (Gates and Hagel) to decrease the number of general officers but out of self preservation that has not happened. Need a new Secretary of Defense with big cajones that will take on the general officer corps and instead of decreasing troop strength, eliminate general officer and staff numbers.
Make no mistake, general officers serve a significant function in a military organization but it is the proliferation of general officer billets to allow for more promotion opportunities across the officer corps that is disconcerting. The backbone of the U.S. military, the NCO Corps, has not seen the explosion in number of junior and mid-ranked NCO billets. The conversation about cuts in defense structure is focused on lower enlisted, NCO, and officer ranks - you know the actual people who are trigger pullers and execute the missions these generals devise.
Unfortunately, the overall number of general officers is not the only issue but each general officer billets increases the number of corresponding support staff. So the number of military members who execute the missions is sacrificed on the alter of increased bureaucracy. And it is this increased bureaucracy that has weighed down the military and driven up the cost with no discernible benefit.
A culling of general officers will upset the power structure. From my vantage point the general officer ranks will want to preserve their own and senior officers will want the ability to continue with a bloated structure that they can move into over time. But this is not a popularity contest. The military is in the throws of a genuine battle over force structure, mission sets, and future threats. If there has ever been a time for a real military transformation, to ensure long term superiority on the battle field, this is the time to make those decisions. Remember, the U.S. military's mission is to win the Nation's wars not to staff actions or create a hierarchical structure unrivaled since the Roman times.
The world is a hell of a lot more complicated than any time in U.S. military history. Current and future warfare will continue to be conducted in a non-static operating environment. The great adversary is a myth in today's geopolitical world. Yes, the Chinese have increased their military prowess and are openly competing with the United States for primacy in the Pacific; but it would be suicidal to believe that the Chinese would directly engage in the U.S. in open combat. Both countries' economic interests are intricately intertwined. Open warfare would wreck havoc and destabilize the world's two largest economies plunging the world into an intractable economic depression. And an economic downturn would be the last thing the Chinese Communist Party wants because that provides a compelling reason for the Chinese population to rebel and thrown off the yoke of communism.
Warfare in the future will continue to be a series of conflicts against: irregular forces; a mix of special forces, limited conventional forces, and insurgents; or terrorist organizations with projection into the homeland. Threats and tactics will continue to evolve and outside of very limited scenarios, warfare will move towards small unit action and irregular warfare. This tactical environment requires a nimble force, with decentralized decision making and a level of autonomy for mission success. This environment does not favor a pantheon of general officers and their staffs to roam the halls of the five sided puzzle palace. Instead, the current headquarters heavy bureaucracy is reminiscent of the vast military structure created to repel the Soviet hordes during the Cold War.
In my own experience, most positions in which general officers fill are over-categorized. An O6 can fill the vast majority of the one star billets. Hell when I served in the U.S. Army, an O6 was the closest thing to a god. "The old man" was the senior leader visible to the troops, who directed our lives and was who we, as junior officers, looked up to for guidance and as an example. The majority of my interactions with general officers have come after I left the military and away from the troops. The DOD needs to adapt and become a nimble, lean force or die under the weight of the bureaucracy.
So where are the cuts coming from, who will stick their neck out to take on the general officer corps? I dare say it will not be this Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is time to look at the current, near term, and long term threats and to develop an agnostic requirements assessment.
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