Where We Have Gone Wrong and Can It Be Fixed

It does not matter which political party is in power, but U.S. foreign policy is an institutional failure. My observation is that foreign policy is considered the redheaded bastard stepchild by the political establishment because it is a messy endeavor with limited immediate impact. Foreign policy requires serious people who have a depth of expertise and a strategic vision to not only look at the most pressing issues but who understand the second and third level effects, in other words a political unicorn.  

The "normal" political modus operandi is: only in moments of crisis and/or turmoil does the political machine focus on foreign policy. A simplistic model of how the U.S. addresses a crisis: 

• The first reaction is to the blame the opposing political party for setting the conditions to embolden the crisis. 
• Next, there may be some diplomatic advances/maneuvering but only to buy time for economic sanctions or approval to deploy military power. 
• At this point there are one of two paths the U.S. will go down: either a continuation of sanctions to some ill defined conclusion or no conclusion at all (ie, Iran or Cuba) or military action which usually ends with regime change and/or "democratic" elections" and a declaration of victory which really means a semi-permanent deployment of military forces.

This model will continue until there is political will to develop and articulate a strategic foreign policy outlook, which includes critical U.S. strategic interests that trigger military action or how to better use and integrate the various instruments of national power. This paradigm shift will only become harder as national and sub-national actors aggressively compete on the world stage, as conflict morphs from direct action to hybrid warfare, and as nation-states retrench towards political and economic nationalism.  

Trumpism has expedited failures by not operating in a collaborative with our allies yet there are nuggets of a way ahead embedded in a warped vision of itself. So where do we go from here? 

It is time to divorce ourselves from the groupthink espoused by think tanks, lobbyists, and the professional political class and re-evaluate our role in the world. Pushing a liberal democracy or an isolationist approach is a fool's errand. Both narratives will ensure foreign policy malaise with no clear way ahead.  

Instead, we need to recognize those areas of international cooperation and cohesion, yet before engagement on the world stage have a strategic foreign policy vision in which U.S. interests are easily understood, articulated, and a part of a larger coherent foreign policy strategy. Here are some components of a cohesive U.S. foreign policy strategy:

Rebuild and re-invigorate alliances, particularly NATO. This does not mean going back to the old post World War II geopolitical constructs. Instead, we need to evaluate those alliances against specified strategic objectives. For example, NATO continues to have strategic value, especially in the wake of increased Russian influence and action in Eastern Europe and the Levant, but NATO should not continue in its current formation. The U.S. cannot continue to be the driving force of the alliance or maintain the force structure as currently postured. Instead, the U.S. should require NATO allies to be take on more of the resource burdens to maintain the alliance (funding, military forces, equipment, etc). The U.S. should provide strategic and targeted resources to enhance the alliance's military forces (intelligence, cyber capabilities, special operations, rotary and fixed wing assets, and defense support to civil authority capabilities). Another change which the U.S. should consider is to adjust the location of forward deployed U.S forces. Rather than the current deployed forces amassed in Germany, the U.S. should redeploy those resources farther East, either Poland or Hungary. By repositioning those resources, the alliance is better postured to combat future Russian aggression or mischief. Russia - the Trump Administration does have an approach which makes sense. We are no longer in a Cold War posture and our post-World War II presence does not make sense. Instead of forces stationed in Germany, re-deploy military assets and forward deploy assets to Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic nations to combat the Russian threat. DoD leadership along with the Congress, needs to pivot assets to combat the hybrid warfare threat. 

Develop a long term China strategy. Unless there is an unforeseen internal disintegration, China will be the U.S.' long-term peer and adversary, both economically and military within INDO-PACOM. To keep China in check, the U.S. needs to re-enforce our military partnerships with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia. How does the U.S. bolster those partnerships most effectively? Through a combination of forward deployed military forces and bolstering security cooperation and assistance programs which provides our partners in the region with capabilities to stymie Chinese regional domination. A mix of intelligence assets, logistics nodes, air assets, naval assets, ground forces, air defense capabilities, and communication nodes is recommended as part of any force package forward stationed in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia. The U.S. should continue to build stronger partnerships with other key regional actors, such as India, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Geopolitical reality will not allow forward deployed military forces with those regional allies, instead a a less intrusive strategic approach should be taken. The strategic decision would be to capitalize on and bolster security cooperation and security assistance programs in the region. Capabilities which should be emphasized include offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, naval assets, intelligence capabilities, training, and emergency management/domestic response capabilities.  

In the Middle East, to include Iran, the U.S. has to come up with a comprehensive strategy on engagement in the region. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman and intervene without an acknowledgement of primary, secondary, and tertiary consequences. We cannot also, just abandon the region but there needs to be vital strategic interests for our engagement. A priority which will need to be addressed is the strategic importance of our oil producing allies. Oil has been a primary reason for the U.S.' historic engagement in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran, during the reign of the Shah, were our closest allies due to ensuring the flow of cheap oil which drives our economic engine. Is a finite fuel source, in an uncertain region, a vital strategic interest? I would say it is more of a dying thread to the region which the U.S. will one day cut due to increased environmentally friendly and reusable resources. Once we see that oil is becoming less of a strategic imperative in the region, we can finally look to the region with a neutral lens and come up with a coherent strategy. The three major geopolitical players we need to address are Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Again we need to look at all three nations outside of the Cold War, post-World War II construct. 

Of the three, Israel is, to me, pretty straight forward. As Arab nations normalize relationships with Israel, the direct threat lessens. How the U.S. engages with Israel will set the stage for the more complicated engagements with Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is in within our strategic interest that Israel is a strong ally, but who is integrated into the larger regional dynamics. What this means is the full execution of the two state solution. Not only does this includes the full recognition of the Palestinian state but also the end of settlement squatting on lands which were designated for the larger Palestinian state, full control of Palestine's economy and borders, and an internationally monitored Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. The right of return is a sticker issue with more emotion attached to a resolution but with the other issues having been resolved and a more trust in the partnership, with time, the right of return issue can be resolved. The other area in which the U.S. needs to exert influence is the rights of Israeli Arabs. As long as Israeli Arabs are treated as second class citizens, the U.S. has an obligation to re-think our security assistance programs and the military hardware which is provided to Israel.

Saudi Arabi is a more complicated relationship built on Cold War necessity and as a means to ensure the free flow of oil. The Kingdom is problematic due to its bullying posture with its neighbors in the Gulf and as a incubator for anti-American sentiment and terrorism funding. As the U.S. moves away from fossil fuels, Saudi Arabi and many of the other oil producing countries we have assisted, will become less of a strategic partner. Instead, our strategic interests will be focused in other areas, most noticeably China, but we must also acknowledge the threats in the region - terrorist organizations, non-State actors who operate in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, etc) - but who are also looking to project capabilities to U.S. interest home and abroad. There is a delicate balance we need to maintain, since the Kingdom may be able to negate terrorist organizations within the region through cooperative agreements, which include intelligence assets and specific training. 

Finally, the most complicated engagement will be developing a relationship with Iran. In the current geopolitical environment, any rapprochement with Iran will be seen as in direct conflict with other allies in the region, predominantly Israel and Saudi Arabia. Here is a case where we need to develop a strategic interest to change the current narrative. Even though Iran is a hostile actor in Syria, there are opportunities to make in-roads to normalizing relationships. U.S. re-engagement with the nuclear deal in which economic sanctions are lifted in response to Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal would be a starting point. Re-establishment of reciprocating diplomatic missions would also be a starting point. Strategically, Iran will have more of a role in the Middle East as sectarianism continues to dominate Middle Eastern politics.

Unless there are politicians acknowledge the U.S.' foreign policy short-sightedness, put aside the political rancor, and actually put the interests of the country in front of their political interest, we will continue to stumble from one immediate crisis to the next. Lives and finite resources will continue to be squandered as we grope in the dark trying to find a coherent strategy which prioritizes U.S. strategic interests.