Geopolitical chess - a Russian Grand Master?
With morbid fascination the world has been watching a complicated and unpredictable geopolitical play unfold right in front of our collective eyes. The actors in this play are familiar but with new set pieces. No longer is it the Soviet Union versus the United States, instead a hyper-nationalistic Russia has risen from Soviet ashes. Are we witnessing a re-kindling of the Cold War or Russian "schizophrenic" gestation as it tries to regain its prominence as a super-power?
I do not believe we will see Russia rival the military might of the old Soviet Union. Russian economics are too dependent on the commodities market (in particular oil and extractive minerals) to sustain a large military in the style of the old Soviet Union. But overwhelming military might is not needed in this day and age to compete on the global stage. Vladimir Putin has repackaged elements of Russian national power (for example: the military - particularly the special forces, information/propaganda resources, and cyber warriors) and annexed Crimea from Ukraine and stirred unrest in areas of Eastern European and the Baltics. This strategy places a premium on disruption, obfuscation, and a chaotic environment in which Russian special and conventional forces can enter as a stabilizing presence.
Putin has seen his strategy work in the Ukraine and caused an environment ripe for additional land grabs in other parts of Eastern Europe and the 'Stans (Belarus, Transdniester region of Moldova, Eastern Estonia, Kazakhstan). But instead of consolidating power and continue to foment discord in those areas where he has a beachhead, Putin made the decision to throw his hat into the continued disintegration of Syria. So why the curveball? What is the strategy to grow Russian chaos out of Eastern Europe into the Levant?
Well we need to throw away the geopolitical playbook for Mr. Putin's actions. Originally, I thought there was some grand strategic design that Putin had for his decisions. I thought Putin was trying to re-establish a Russian hegemony across the former Iron Curtain and to position NATO to either hesitate in the face of new Russian aggression that allows for consolidation of territory or to act irrationally and provide Russia with an excuse to "rescue" minority Russian populations in Eastern Europe. But for reasons only truly known to Mr. Putin, Russia threw its military might into the Syrian civil war under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
Instead of a grand unifying strategy, I believe Putin's actions has two objectives. First is to thumb his nose at the United States and to a lesser degree NATO. He sees the U.S. as the cause for the Russian fall from grace as a Soviet Superpower, and he uses the U.S. as his scapegoat for current economic conditions. And NATO encroachment on perceived Russian territory gives countries an alternative to Russian influence. For Putin it is all about the loss of the Soviet empire and influence in the world. He sees significant decisions being made over Russian objections and U.S. focus turning towards the rise of China. I believe Putin's actions are psychological chess moves to try a re-claim a more glorious time.
The second objective in my mind is more disconcerting and bothersome. Put in's Russia is setting up a counter-balance and alternative for countries with dubious or authoritarian leaders, who are actively condemned by the West. By setting up an alternative to U.S. and Western influences, countries can find a champion who does not care about human rights or government accountability and continue to lead their countries in a means that works for them. No longer will an Assad's Syria kowtow (in Assad and Russia's mind) to Western demands. Now there is a benefactor who will support them and because of the position they hold within the world community (permanent membership on the UN Security Council and backed by nuclear weapons) provide leverage against the West, a de facto Iron Curtain of sorts. Of course there is a quid pro quo. Russia has historically wanted greater influence in the Mediterranean and warm water ports to house elements of its navy.
Why this alternative scenario is problematic is because there are numerous countries that are interested might in Russian assistance. We have seen Russia come to Syria's aid and it is not a large leap of faith to see Russia becoming more involved in other autocratic regimes. Libya has potential and Russia would tip the balance militarily for one of the "legitimate" factions. And how would a Russian naval station just south of Spain and Italy and with the potential to interdict shipping traffic through the Straights of Gibraltar sound? Also there are countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are slowly resorting back to autocratic rule and may tire of Western lecturing (Rwanda and Uganda come to mind) on democracy and human rights or are already pariah states that need a significant benefactor (Zimbabwe). An alternative provides centuries with an outlet for bad behavior in light of perceived Western arrogance.
The saving grace to an extended period of this new Russian aggression is economic conditions. Current Russian GDP fell 5.3% over a one year period with inflation climbing to 17%. And Brent Crude Oil price per barrel is now $31.72, which is one of Russia's most significant sources of revenue. These economic factors make a sustained Russian overseas interventionist policy unsustainable or at least provides impetus for an internal discord. I believe that we see a younger Russian population who does not want to be alienated from the rest of the world community and want opportunity to achieve the prosperity and basic rights they see around the world through social media and other international media outlets.
U.S. policy needs to be firm in the face of Putin's actions. A simple example is further bolster our ties with our eastern NATO allies, providing military assistance where it is warranted, both in terms of troops but also in equipment and follow on training. Also, we need to look at U.S. military basing in Europe, Does it still make sense to have the largest portion of military forces in Germany? Instead, the U.S. needs to re-look permanently moving military forces out of Germany to either forward stationing in Poland and/or Hungary. Finally, we need to bolster Ukraine. Advise and Assist operations need to be intensified to assist in building a capable military and also a reserve force both whom are under the control of the rule of law and civilian oversight. But there also needs to further government assistance in building the democratic institutions that will enable Ukraine to flourish no matter the leader.
I do not believe we will see Russia rival the military might of the old Soviet Union. Russian economics are too dependent on the commodities market (in particular oil and extractive minerals) to sustain a large military in the style of the old Soviet Union. But overwhelming military might is not needed in this day and age to compete on the global stage. Vladimir Putin has repackaged elements of Russian national power (for example: the military - particularly the special forces, information/propaganda resources, and cyber warriors) and annexed Crimea from Ukraine and stirred unrest in areas of Eastern European and the Baltics. This strategy places a premium on disruption, obfuscation, and a chaotic environment in which Russian special and conventional forces can enter as a stabilizing presence.
Putin has seen his strategy work in the Ukraine and caused an environment ripe for additional land grabs in other parts of Eastern Europe and the 'Stans (Belarus, Transdniester region of Moldova, Eastern Estonia, Kazakhstan). But instead of consolidating power and continue to foment discord in those areas where he has a beachhead, Putin made the decision to throw his hat into the continued disintegration of Syria. So why the curveball? What is the strategy to grow Russian chaos out of Eastern Europe into the Levant?
Well we need to throw away the geopolitical playbook for Mr. Putin's actions. Originally, I thought there was some grand strategic design that Putin had for his decisions. I thought Putin was trying to re-establish a Russian hegemony across the former Iron Curtain and to position NATO to either hesitate in the face of new Russian aggression that allows for consolidation of territory or to act irrationally and provide Russia with an excuse to "rescue" minority Russian populations in Eastern Europe. But for reasons only truly known to Mr. Putin, Russia threw its military might into the Syrian civil war under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
Instead of a grand unifying strategy, I believe Putin's actions has two objectives. First is to thumb his nose at the United States and to a lesser degree NATO. He sees the U.S. as the cause for the Russian fall from grace as a Soviet Superpower, and he uses the U.S. as his scapegoat for current economic conditions. And NATO encroachment on perceived Russian territory gives countries an alternative to Russian influence. For Putin it is all about the loss of the Soviet empire and influence in the world. He sees significant decisions being made over Russian objections and U.S. focus turning towards the rise of China. I believe Putin's actions are psychological chess moves to try a re-claim a more glorious time.
The second objective in my mind is more disconcerting and bothersome. Put in's Russia is setting up a counter-balance and alternative for countries with dubious or authoritarian leaders, who are actively condemned by the West. By setting up an alternative to U.S. and Western influences, countries can find a champion who does not care about human rights or government accountability and continue to lead their countries in a means that works for them. No longer will an Assad's Syria kowtow (in Assad and Russia's mind) to Western demands. Now there is a benefactor who will support them and because of the position they hold within the world community (permanent membership on the UN Security Council and backed by nuclear weapons) provide leverage against the West, a de facto Iron Curtain of sorts. Of course there is a quid pro quo. Russia has historically wanted greater influence in the Mediterranean and warm water ports to house elements of its navy.
Why this alternative scenario is problematic is because there are numerous countries that are interested might in Russian assistance. We have seen Russia come to Syria's aid and it is not a large leap of faith to see Russia becoming more involved in other autocratic regimes. Libya has potential and Russia would tip the balance militarily for one of the "legitimate" factions. And how would a Russian naval station just south of Spain and Italy and with the potential to interdict shipping traffic through the Straights of Gibraltar sound? Also there are countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are slowly resorting back to autocratic rule and may tire of Western lecturing (Rwanda and Uganda come to mind) on democracy and human rights or are already pariah states that need a significant benefactor (Zimbabwe). An alternative provides centuries with an outlet for bad behavior in light of perceived Western arrogance.
The saving grace to an extended period of this new Russian aggression is economic conditions. Current Russian GDP fell 5.3% over a one year period with inflation climbing to 17%. And Brent Crude Oil price per barrel is now $31.72, which is one of Russia's most significant sources of revenue. These economic factors make a sustained Russian overseas interventionist policy unsustainable or at least provides impetus for an internal discord. I believe that we see a younger Russian population who does not want to be alienated from the rest of the world community and want opportunity to achieve the prosperity and basic rights they see around the world through social media and other international media outlets.
U.S. policy needs to be firm in the face of Putin's actions. A simple example is further bolster our ties with our eastern NATO allies, providing military assistance where it is warranted, both in terms of troops but also in equipment and follow on training. Also, we need to look at U.S. military basing in Europe, Does it still make sense to have the largest portion of military forces in Germany? Instead, the U.S. needs to re-look permanently moving military forces out of Germany to either forward stationing in Poland and/or Hungary. Finally, we need to bolster Ukraine. Advise and Assist operations need to be intensified to assist in building a capable military and also a reserve force both whom are under the control of the rule of law and civilian oversight. But there also needs to further government assistance in building the democratic institutions that will enable Ukraine to flourish no matter the leader.
Policy is a fascinating term and often misused. In the February 2015 edition of the National Security Strategy signed by President Obama is the following statement, "large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan defined so much of American foreign policy over the past decade." This is not policy; this is national strategy. Reviewing the March 2006 National Security Strategy signed by President Bush are the following, "we led an international coalition to topple the dictator of Iraq" and "we have joined with the Afghan people to bring down the Taliban regime." These are proper statements in a National Security Strategy.
ReplyDeleteStrategy is the art and science of conducting a large-scale and long-term military campaign. Policy is a course of action designed to influence and determine decisions and actions. Policy, and hence national foreign policy, influences national security strategy--not the other way around. This means wars do not influence our national foreign policy--policy determines our actions, in this example, our wars. National foreign policy is how the United States conducts relations with other foreign governments and entities.
Unlike our National Security Strategy documents, US foreign policy is generally not written down in a signed series of nested documents: National Security Strategy to National Defense Strategy to National Military Strategy. The Department of Defense is the lead entity in carrying out national security, whereas the Department of State is the lead entity in carrying out national foreign policy. The Department of State doesn't write nice clearly defined US foreign policy. Our foreign policy is developed over a President's term from speeches, statements, and official meetings. Therefore, the how the United States conducts relations is often difficult to discern.
National foreign policy addresses issues in every region and every country. Yes, foreign policy does influence military decisions and actions, but foreign policy is the primary venue to discuss and formulate humanitarian, environmental, economic, health, natural resources and every other issue important to the United States. For example, a national foreign policy issue is the Muslim terrorist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The current US policy in combating ISIS is, "it will not involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil." This is from a speech President Obama gave in September 2015. Again, nothing written, but a speech. The policy, right or wrong, then is to not involve US military troops in Iraq or Syria. I'm not a proponent of this policy, but this is the right venue to discuss this issue. Meaning the statement is a policy issue, not a strategy issue. A strategy statement is, "we will defeat ISIS with every means available to the United States."
The determination to not involve US troops in Iraq or Syria to fight ISIS in 2014-2015 is a policy decision. Remember policy informs strategy. So, here's the problem; from the 2015 National Security Strategy, "We will deter and defeat any adversary that threatens our national security and that of our allies." So, if it's our US policy to not involve US troops in Iraq or Syria, then how can the United States deter and defeat any adversary [ISIS] that threatens our national security? Policy and strategy are supposed to be complimentary. In this case, and numerous others, they do not complement each other. Speeches and policy statements do no match written strategy. And therefore, actions taken do not support foreign policy.