Is it time yet? A Disturbing Reality.
Can we, yes I mean the U.S. and to a larger extent the world, finally make a concerted effort to fully engage ISIS and to end the Syrian civil war? The global community has neglected our humanity. Instead of actually doing something to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people, either through inaction or bias we have left the situation unabated and civilians (innocents) are dying to try and escape to a better life.
* image courtesy of indianexpress.com
Now look at Aylan! He is the result of a cowardly U.S. political establishment and an Administration that neglected to act when Assad crossed "the red line in the sand." What we see of our American politicians is a cowardly group that has abandoned a region torn apart by conflict and a mass forced migration, and an American public who are more interested in the latest Kardashian news.
But America is only one of the many accomplices to have failed. Europe and Turkey have also failed Aylan. A biased and stereotyped attitude has hindered those looking for a modicum of a better life from even having an opportunity. How come the American political debate about bringing more refugees from Syria predicated on concern about ISIS infiltration rather than resorting to our basic humanity to help those in direst need?
I am not naive and understand nefarious actors will most likely take advantage of the humanitarian crisis to inflict devastation. But if politicians want to talk about American Exceptionalism, than it is time that we step up and lead by example across all domains of power (economic, diplomatic, and military) to alleviate this humanitarian crisis.
So what needs to be done?
It is not a simple task and we may end up in a quagmire but there are some basic steps to take.
First is a two pronged military action against both ISIS and President Assad. ISIS is an immediate concern. The continued slaughter of those who do not espouse the ISIS philosophy and destruction of the world's cultural heritage (Temple of Bel in Palmyra), continues at an alarming rate. Outside of the Kurds valiant efforts to stem the ISIS tide, the international community only seems able to stomach a prolonged air campaign. Let's be very clear air power does not win wars. It may shape the battle field and soften a combatant's capability and resolve but only ground troops can take and hold ground and completely end an occupation. It is time to put boots on the ground - both combat power and humanitarian assistance. American, European, and Arab League forces need to become more of a combat presence.
ISIS is only one half of the Syrian equation. The other component is the Syrian civil war waged between Assad's forces and various rebel forces. ISIS is a straightforward threat, the actors in the Syrian civil war complicates a response. The various factions have different relationships with one another and with outside powers, particularly the U.S. Finding allies on the ground is difficult at best since outside actors have their own agendas and stopping the civil war may not be the objective. And it will be difficult for the international community to be militarily engaged and effective on both fronts. A strategy of destroy-contain-destroy makes the most sense in Syria. Engage and destroy ISIS while containing the civil war factions and after the defeat of ISIS to fully engage and destroy Assad's forces and allies. The endgame is to remove Assad and develop the institutions to rebuild Syria (see http://joetrella3.blogspot.com/2015/08/disintegration-libyan-style.html on how the Libyan situation can be a model for Syria).
Even when both ISIS and Assad's forces and allies have been defeated the recipe for renewed violence continues. It is the post-conflict phase that will spell success or failure. The world's diplomats will need to be fearless, not bunkered in their safe compounds. The U.S. State Department better figure out how to have it's principles and staff take calculated risks to engage in potentially unpleasant situations.
A new type of diplomacy that engages with rebel groups, whatever rump of government that exists, the diaspora, and other stakeholders in a conflict environment is needed. Diplomats will need to be more assertive and place themselves in dangerous or uncomfortable situations. The actors in Syria have their own agendas and balancing these agendas will be a primary focus of the diplomatic core. It is no longer a cocktail and tuxedo environment, instead it will necessitate that the players have a grasp for all instruments on national power and be able to role up their sleeves and get dirty. And yes for all of those nay-sayers, American diplomacy will need to engage Iran and its proxies in the region (aka Hezbollah). This is an opportunity for Iran to show how committed they are to relinquish their role as a pariah state and come into the international community fold.
For the military, it is going to take an unified approach across all elements of the Department of Defense (DoD), to include Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard troops. The "need to win phase 0" is the latest catchphrase running through DoD, but winning across all phases on the continuum of operations will stabilize the region.
Advise and assist operations will need to continue so that the military capability and capacity of key allies in the region (Kurds, Jordanians, Lebanese, and to a certain degree Iraqis) is bolstered. Also, security cooperation efforts will play a significant role to shape national institutions and a security apparatus that respects the righted of all Syrians.
Materiel, training, and expertise will be needed throughout the region after years of devastation. But it is not only military expertise that is needed, also governance and private sector expertise. Without those two pieces as integral parts of reconstruction we will end up with another Iraq (at best) or South Sudan or Libya (at worst). Bringing all three pieces (military, economic, and diplomacy/governance) is where the U.S. needs to get out of its comfort zone and look for untapped capacity. I would hazard to recommend that the States have a lot of that untapped capacity. States work through the inter-agency process and integrate at various levels on government on a daily basis to provide services and goods to its citizens. And States have conduits with key private sector companies in their jurisdictions that should be resources to develop a Syrian private sector. If we do not want to make the same mistakes over again, as seen in other countries after the end of armed hostilities, the U.S. government better look to States as a partner and bring them in early to do the grassroots work.
We as a society have failed Aylan. It is time politicians to stop dithering and bickering and make things right. Do not accept a political dialogue steeped in partisan blathering and BS, instead push the politicians to positive action.
* image courtesy of indianexpress.com
Now look at Aylan! He is the result of a cowardly U.S. political establishment and an Administration that neglected to act when Assad crossed "the red line in the sand." What we see of our American politicians is a cowardly group that has abandoned a region torn apart by conflict and a mass forced migration, and an American public who are more interested in the latest Kardashian news.
But America is only one of the many accomplices to have failed. Europe and Turkey have also failed Aylan. A biased and stereotyped attitude has hindered those looking for a modicum of a better life from even having an opportunity. How come the American political debate about bringing more refugees from Syria predicated on concern about ISIS infiltration rather than resorting to our basic humanity to help those in direst need?
I am not naive and understand nefarious actors will most likely take advantage of the humanitarian crisis to inflict devastation. But if politicians want to talk about American Exceptionalism, than it is time that we step up and lead by example across all domains of power (economic, diplomatic, and military) to alleviate this humanitarian crisis.
So what needs to be done?
It is not a simple task and we may end up in a quagmire but there are some basic steps to take.
First is a two pronged military action against both ISIS and President Assad. ISIS is an immediate concern. The continued slaughter of those who do not espouse the ISIS philosophy and destruction of the world's cultural heritage (Temple of Bel in Palmyra), continues at an alarming rate. Outside of the Kurds valiant efforts to stem the ISIS tide, the international community only seems able to stomach a prolonged air campaign. Let's be very clear air power does not win wars. It may shape the battle field and soften a combatant's capability and resolve but only ground troops can take and hold ground and completely end an occupation. It is time to put boots on the ground - both combat power and humanitarian assistance. American, European, and Arab League forces need to become more of a combat presence.
ISIS is only one half of the Syrian equation. The other component is the Syrian civil war waged between Assad's forces and various rebel forces. ISIS is a straightforward threat, the actors in the Syrian civil war complicates a response. The various factions have different relationships with one another and with outside powers, particularly the U.S. Finding allies on the ground is difficult at best since outside actors have their own agendas and stopping the civil war may not be the objective. And it will be difficult for the international community to be militarily engaged and effective on both fronts. A strategy of destroy-contain-destroy makes the most sense in Syria. Engage and destroy ISIS while containing the civil war factions and after the defeat of ISIS to fully engage and destroy Assad's forces and allies. The endgame is to remove Assad and develop the institutions to rebuild Syria (see http://joetrella3.blogspot.com/2015/08/disintegration-libyan-style.html on how the Libyan situation can be a model for Syria).
Even when both ISIS and Assad's forces and allies have been defeated the recipe for renewed violence continues. It is the post-conflict phase that will spell success or failure. The world's diplomats will need to be fearless, not bunkered in their safe compounds. The U.S. State Department better figure out how to have it's principles and staff take calculated risks to engage in potentially unpleasant situations.
A new type of diplomacy that engages with rebel groups, whatever rump of government that exists, the diaspora, and other stakeholders in a conflict environment is needed. Diplomats will need to be more assertive and place themselves in dangerous or uncomfortable situations. The actors in Syria have their own agendas and balancing these agendas will be a primary focus of the diplomatic core. It is no longer a cocktail and tuxedo environment, instead it will necessitate that the players have a grasp for all instruments on national power and be able to role up their sleeves and get dirty. And yes for all of those nay-sayers, American diplomacy will need to engage Iran and its proxies in the region (aka Hezbollah). This is an opportunity for Iran to show how committed they are to relinquish their role as a pariah state and come into the international community fold.
For the military, it is going to take an unified approach across all elements of the Department of Defense (DoD), to include Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard troops. The "need to win phase 0" is the latest catchphrase running through DoD, but winning across all phases on the continuum of operations will stabilize the region.
Advise and assist operations will need to continue so that the military capability and capacity of key allies in the region (Kurds, Jordanians, Lebanese, and to a certain degree Iraqis) is bolstered. Also, security cooperation efforts will play a significant role to shape national institutions and a security apparatus that respects the righted of all Syrians.
Materiel, training, and expertise will be needed throughout the region after years of devastation. But it is not only military expertise that is needed, also governance and private sector expertise. Without those two pieces as integral parts of reconstruction we will end up with another Iraq (at best) or South Sudan or Libya (at worst). Bringing all three pieces (military, economic, and diplomacy/governance) is where the U.S. needs to get out of its comfort zone and look for untapped capacity. I would hazard to recommend that the States have a lot of that untapped capacity. States work through the inter-agency process and integrate at various levels on government on a daily basis to provide services and goods to its citizens. And States have conduits with key private sector companies in their jurisdictions that should be resources to develop a Syrian private sector. If we do not want to make the same mistakes over again, as seen in other countries after the end of armed hostilities, the U.S. government better look to States as a partner and bring them in early to do the grassroots work.
We as a society have failed Aylan. It is time politicians to stop dithering and bickering and make things right. Do not accept a political dialogue steeped in partisan blathering and BS, instead push the politicians to positive action.
Doctrine is the body of principles presented by an organization--in this case, the Office of the President establishes United States doctrine through speeches, statements, or written documents.
ReplyDeleteIn reviewing "the Obama Doctrine" in the April 2016 edition of The Atlantic I was surprised to find a limited discussion on actual doctrine. Jeffrey Goldberg wrote the piece from his interviews with Obama and reviewing Obama's many speeches and writings. He noted the "responsibility to protect" doctrine (which was adapted from President George W, Bush). The United States "credibility" and whether countries actually believe the United States. Promoting "values like democracy and human rights." To spur other countries to take action [discussion on not taking military action for Syria crossing the red line] for themselves, which became the "leading from behind" doctrine.
My interpretation of Obama's doctrine is the pivot to Asia, lead from behind and climate change. Obama decides every issue within these three principles he believes are the most critical aspects of our U.S. national character. For example, when discussing a foreign policy issue of Israeli / Palestinian peace; Obama falls to lead from behind. He believes Saudi Arabia, Iran, the European Union, somebody, should step in and help solve the issue. When discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama steps into the pivot to Asia role--TPP is a priority. When asked about national security threats, Obama immediately discusses the highest priority threat--climate change; not Islamic terrorism, a nuclear Iran or North Korea, or China's military aggression in the South China Sea.
The majority of the article was a an inter-mixed discussion on foreign policy issues and national security issues. Foreign policy; Obama entered the White House determined to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the playbook of using militarized responses to different events, the opening of relations with Cuba, and strengthening multilateral organizations Strategy; Assad earned dire punishment--the red line, threat to Israel and our allies, Russia's invasion of Crimea, and no comprehensive solution to Islamic terrorism.
And a few instances of operational plans not aligning with national security, or foreign policy. Immediately after the "red line" of Syria using chemical weapons on his own civilian population in the summer of 2011 the military (Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander US Central Command) was ready to go to war in Syria. Obama said, if Assad uses chemical weapons, then the U.S. will strike. But, Obama's National Security Strategy did not match the military operational plan of intervention. Therefore, Obama did not authorize the use of military force.
The problem noted in the article, and the author captures this correctly, is the disjointed understanding of doctrine, foreign policy, and national security strategy. In an effort to portray Obama's Doctrine, Goldberg literally captures an unfocused discussion of doctrine, foreign policy, and national security strategy.