Disintegration - Libyan Style
To plagiarize and bastardize an old saying: Libya disintegrates as the world fiddles. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized countries to take "necessary action" to protect civilians from pending attack by forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi. NATO, seeing a potential southern security risk, engaged in a bombing campaign and enforced a no fly zone that balanced the field to allow rebellion to flourish that ended with the execution of Gaddafi. The end of Gaddafi should have ushered a new era for Libya. Or so we thought.
In the four years since the dawn of the Arab Spring, Libya has become another African basket case - a failing state that is headed towards disintegration and a possible forerunner to a region that harkens back to precolonial boundaries thus ending the Westphalian state in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region and sub-Saharan Africa. Sectarian and tribal allegiances is becoming the preeminent political force instead of the nation-state.
But is Libya's fate sealed? Even as Libya careens into the abyss, there is a slim possibility to "right the ship" and bolster the Libyan state. If done properly and successfully the methodology used to address Libya could be a blueprint for 21st century engagement with failing/failed states. So how to proceed?
Stabilize the security situation. Between the threat of IS (and particularly after establishing a foothold in Sirte) and the internal conflicts between various militias and their political handlers, the international community needs to take decisive action and improve the security environment. Without a more stable security situation, stakeholders will either: not endanger their people and send them into Libya, or so constrain their people's movements that they will not be effective.
To achieve stability, a combination of stakeholder air power, ground troops, and intelligence assets should engage IS elements to drive them out of Sirte and limit their capability to further consolidate operations. Unfortunately, as we have seen with Al-Qaeda, operational capability can be degraded and limited but complete elimination is impossible.
While the EU/NATO, the Arab League, and the U.S. tactically engage IS elements across the continuum of operations, the UN and NGOs need to negotiate terms between the various Libyan actors to establish a stable internal security environment and a caretaker government. This caretaker government would encompass various tribal representatives and political ideologies and act as legislative body, who will elect an executive to interface with all stakeholders.
Establish a multi-pronged programmatic approach. Once the security situation has stabilized, stakeholders need to address issues across ALL levels of government - local, regional, and national. Past efforts have focused on the national level issues and have been mostly short term engagements.
During an Atlantic Council 2014 meeting on the Fezzan, Ms. Valerie Stocker (independent researcher and consultant) and Mr. Eamonn Gearon (The Siwa Group) independently commented that the average Libyan saw foreign assistance programs as: mostly geared to national efforts and not at the local or regional levels of government; not effective; and that stakeholders were only in for the short term. Both Ms. Stocker and Mr. Gearon mentioned that Libyans desire more international engagement to help build local security capabilities and develop government institutions at all levels but assistance has not been aligned with the needs of the average Libyan.
A multi-prong approach will take effort by all stakeholders, and includes NGOs and private industry. Programs and assistance need to build local, regional, and national capabilities simultaneously while providing training and expertise on how to bridge and collaborate across multi-levels of government.
For the U.S., counter to how we do much of our security cooperation, resources should be concentrated to meet local needs first, obviously with the caretaker government's inputs. Developing trusted local government and judicial institutions, along with the private sector engagement in local economic opportunities and industry subject matter expertise, drives immediate and transparent impact to the Libyan population. As these programs succeed, they can be matriculated to fully develop regional and finally national institutions and industries.
Be in it for the long haul. Local community leaders/members saw previous assistance as the international community's "need to do something" but that they were not truly vested in long term or durable results. Assistance to Libya will be long term. There is no simple easy way to do this, think Republic of Korea like assistance after completion of the Korean War.
The international community cannot continue to make the same mistakes over again. Elections are not the goal of assistance with these failing/failed countries.I would even say that elections should be a last step for Libya. Instead viable and trusted institutions that respect all tribes/factions within Libya and allow for legitimate grievances and debate to occur and that will take time and concerted subject matter expertise.
If Libya continues to disintegrate, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Mali, Sudan, and possibly Morocco could possible fragment and what we know as the modern nation-state may instead become the beginning of re-drawing political boundaries along tribal and sectarian fault lines All elements of national and international power need to be engaged to assist Libya through the morass. Who has the resolve to meet the challenge?
In the four years since the dawn of the Arab Spring, Libya has become another African basket case - a failing state that is headed towards disintegration and a possible forerunner to a region that harkens back to precolonial boundaries thus ending the Westphalian state in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region and sub-Saharan Africa. Sectarian and tribal allegiances is becoming the preeminent political force instead of the nation-state.
But is Libya's fate sealed? Even as Libya careens into the abyss, there is a slim possibility to "right the ship" and bolster the Libyan state. If done properly and successfully the methodology used to address Libya could be a blueprint for 21st century engagement with failing/failed states. So how to proceed?
- Understand the geopolitical dynamics place and historical grievances. Those who would assist in redevelopment of the Libyan state need the cultural understanding that Libya is not a homogeneous country. Figure 1 shows the historical division of Libya into three distinct regions - Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. Each of these regions differ in population makeup, geography and available natural resources and under Gaddafi they each fared differently.
- In the past, Western countries engaged in conflicts without a basic understanding of the situation on the ground or what makes the local populace tick (think: France's counter insurgency in Algeria; the US police action in Vietnam; or the Soviet Union's Afghanistan quagmire) and were embarrassed.
- To successfully address Libya's issues, it will take a global approach. Actors should include:
- EU/NATO members engaged in the bombing campaigns. If you broke it - you fix it! Europe has a moral imperative to lead efforts to stem the disintegration of Libya.
- The UN. Under Chapter 1 of the UN charter, the UN has a responsibility "to maintain security... and achieve international cooperation to economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character..."
- The Arab League. Let's be honest, what is happening in various Middle Eastern countries (in which I include North Africa, the Levant, and Arabian peninsula) and the regional threat of IS and its affiliates should be of great concern to Arab League members.
- The US. The US has security interests in the region (such as: counter-terrorism operations, drug smuggling, human trafficking) that will require American resources or that the US has capabilities and capacities that other countries do not have to be mobilized.
- There is no magic bullet and that all stakeholders need to recognize that this will be a long term investment that involves multi-dimensional (top down and bottom up) engagement. Issues that hound Libya are at all levels of government (town/local, regional, and national).
- A greater understanding, by all stakeholders, of the operating environment - to include majority and minority tribes, current political situation, economic system/outlook, current threats/risks, military capability, border security to name a few.
- Finally, elections are not and should not be the end all/be all of the involvement. Instead, a unelected caretaker government is acceptable so that all who are involved can assist the Libyans to build democratic institutions that span regional and national needs. These institutions must be seen as legitimate by the local populace.
Stabilize the security situation. Between the threat of IS (and particularly after establishing a foothold in Sirte) and the internal conflicts between various militias and their political handlers, the international community needs to take decisive action and improve the security environment. Without a more stable security situation, stakeholders will either: not endanger their people and send them into Libya, or so constrain their people's movements that they will not be effective.
To achieve stability, a combination of stakeholder air power, ground troops, and intelligence assets should engage IS elements to drive them out of Sirte and limit their capability to further consolidate operations. Unfortunately, as we have seen with Al-Qaeda, operational capability can be degraded and limited but complete elimination is impossible.
While the EU/NATO, the Arab League, and the U.S. tactically engage IS elements across the continuum of operations, the UN and NGOs need to negotiate terms between the various Libyan actors to establish a stable internal security environment and a caretaker government. This caretaker government would encompass various tribal representatives and political ideologies and act as legislative body, who will elect an executive to interface with all stakeholders.
Establish a multi-pronged programmatic approach. Once the security situation has stabilized, stakeholders need to address issues across ALL levels of government - local, regional, and national. Past efforts have focused on the national level issues and have been mostly short term engagements.
During an Atlantic Council 2014 meeting on the Fezzan, Ms. Valerie Stocker (independent researcher and consultant) and Mr. Eamonn Gearon (The Siwa Group) independently commented that the average Libyan saw foreign assistance programs as: mostly geared to national efforts and not at the local or regional levels of government; not effective; and that stakeholders were only in for the short term. Both Ms. Stocker and Mr. Gearon mentioned that Libyans desire more international engagement to help build local security capabilities and develop government institutions at all levels but assistance has not been aligned with the needs of the average Libyan.
A multi-prong approach will take effort by all stakeholders, and includes NGOs and private industry. Programs and assistance need to build local, regional, and national capabilities simultaneously while providing training and expertise on how to bridge and collaborate across multi-levels of government.
For the U.S., counter to how we do much of our security cooperation, resources should be concentrated to meet local needs first, obviously with the caretaker government's inputs. Developing trusted local government and judicial institutions, along with the private sector engagement in local economic opportunities and industry subject matter expertise, drives immediate and transparent impact to the Libyan population. As these programs succeed, they can be matriculated to fully develop regional and finally national institutions and industries.
Be in it for the long haul. Local community leaders/members saw previous assistance as the international community's "need to do something" but that they were not truly vested in long term or durable results. Assistance to Libya will be long term. There is no simple easy way to do this, think Republic of Korea like assistance after completion of the Korean War.
The international community cannot continue to make the same mistakes over again. Elections are not the goal of assistance with these failing/failed countries.I would even say that elections should be a last step for Libya. Instead viable and trusted institutions that respect all tribes/factions within Libya and allow for legitimate grievances and debate to occur and that will take time and concerted subject matter expertise.
If Libya continues to disintegrate, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Mali, Sudan, and possibly Morocco could possible fragment and what we know as the modern nation-state may instead become the beginning of re-drawing political boundaries along tribal and sectarian fault lines All elements of national and international power need to be engaged to assist Libya through the morass. Who has the resolve to meet the challenge?
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