What we have here is failure to communicate......

Figure 1 - MENA region with IS territory in red
The year is 2020 and the world map has been significantly altered. ISIS controls a larger swath of territory running through Iraq, Syria, parts of the Sinai, Sudan, Libya, the Fezzan, and northern Mali. Allied groups terrorize Yemen, Lebanon, Mauritania and Western Sahara. From these locations, ISIS cells have strategic reach into Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and even into parts of Europe. Rome is a primary target with NATO and its allies in the crosshairs. The turmoil has further compounded Palestinian and Israeli relations, as well as allowed China to press its strategic advantage in the Pacific and the Russians to play devils advocate in Eastern Europe, with a further distingration of Ukranian national borders, threats to the Baltic countries, and movement to integrate countries in the Balkans.

Where has the United States been as these events have unfolded?

We continue to see an Administration and Congress that is more interested in scoring political points to please their bases rather than address the most pressing issues, both domestically and internationally, of our time. The domestic agenda will always dominate the political narrative since foreign policy is the bastard red-headed stepchild to the American government. Yet, no matter how much the U.S. government wants to put their collective heads in the sand on foreign policy, the immediate issues rocking the rest of the world will come to rest on our shores - either overtly or covertly.

The MENA region is the modern epicenter of conflict. Ancient grievances and an environment of the youth angst continues to befuddle the world's political leadership. Militarily there is no clear exit strategy for the region. The rise of ISIS has compounded a delicate and frustrating region, especially in light of its' gruesome and horrific criminal actions. And it is the rise of ISIS that is a direct threat to U.S. allies in the region. And if left to continiue to fester in the region, ISIS could become the next ideological exporter to disenchanted youth and become an indirect threat to our European allies and to the United States itself through terroristic attacks.

So how do we address the threat poised by ISIS? To answer this, we first need to deconstruct the threat and the operational environment. I contend that poltical and military leadership needs to come at the ISIS threat with "outside the box" thinking. I agree with Audrey Kurth Cronin's recent Foreign Affairs magazine article, that challenges the traditional notion that ISIS is a terrorist group. One component of international terrorism, as defined by the FBI, is: "appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping."

Instead, Ms. Cronin categorizes ISIS as a "....psuedo-state led by a conventional army." I agree with Ms. Cronin's assessment and see that ISIS is the next iteration in the extremist Islamic jihadi evolution. Al-Qaeda planted the ideological seed of an abhorrant strain of Islam, based on the strict interpretations of the Wahhabists, but their capabilities were limited due to reliance on an allied Taligan-led government to ensure their continued existence.

ISIS, on the other hand, has "operationalized" the al-Qaeda ideology and set up a pseudo nation-state with: a capital (Raqqa); occupied terroritory; delivery of public services; revenue collection; accumulation of debt; a government infrastructure; and a standing military. ISIS has achieved its basic political objective of establishing a caliphate, now it looks to expand its terroritory in the region.

A counter-insurgency strategy is ineffective in direct action against an entrenched pseudo-state. Instead it will take deft diplomatic, defense, and development (D3) action to avoid the situation as described in the introduction. Now is the time for the U.S government and our Western allies to get off its collective fourth point of contact and "walk the walk" instead of just "talk the talk."

In previous posts, I have advocated that the U.S. government should immediately recognize and diplomatically and militarily support an independent Kurdish state. I will not dwell on the reasons why this is critical as part of a counter-ISIS strategy. Instead, there is a need for holistic D3 strategy that bolsters all allies (and potential allies) in the region with surgical implementation of U.S. military strength. 

The American public has a low tolerance for international engagements. The overwhelming number of Americans have no connection to our military and really do not understand the sacrifices and how dirty the job is in dealing with our adversaries. So a robust U.S. military engagement against ISIS is a bridge too far. Instead, we need to support those who are actively taking the fight to ISIS and engage other regional actors to help develop their capabilities and capacities for direct action against ISIS.

Jordan and Egypt are currently conducting sustained aerial campaigns against ISIS, but air power cannot take and hold ground. This is where the long slog begins. We should continue to support Egypt, Jordan, Saudis, and the UAE with military hardware to replenish their ammunition stores, as well as a robust Search and Rescue (SAR) capability (with a rapid reaction force) to assist with potential downed pilots. Furthermore, we should engage in "advise and assist" operations with the Kurds, Iraqis, Lebanese, palatable Syrian rebel groups (if they still exist) and Turks to contain and destroy ISIS. Our Special Forces will be the tip of the spear to advise and assist ground forces to take the fight to ISIS.

But military action is limited. As part of an overall strategy, we will also need to diplomatically engage with others in the region.

Israel may be our most significant and staunchest ally, but we will need to limit their involvement to a supporting role. Unfortunately, Israeli military direct action may potentially fracture an Arab coalition, instead the Israelis should support the coalition with SAR capability and a blocking action along the southern Syrian border.

No matter what blubbering pundits may espouse, the U.S. will need to engage Iran as a part of a counter-ISIS strategy. Yes, this is tricky since a de-stabilized region creates a vacuum that Iran (and its proxy Hezbollah) would want top exploit. Without our engagement there is a real possibility of a wider conflict that further engulfs the region. In the context of ISIS, there should be limited cooperation with the Iranians through a diplomatic exchange focused strictly on containing and destroying ISIS. In no way should there be a carte blanche renewal of diplomatic ties but a limited exchange which could establish some trust that can be foundation for further normalization of relations.

The other actor in the immediate region that will need a gentle diplomatic touch is the Palestinians. In many ways the Palestinian - Israeli conflict is the flashpoint (or propaganda tool - for those of a certain political bent) that creates disaffection and is used as a recruiting tool for militant Islamists. U.S. failure to honestly address Palestinian grievances further exacerbates Arab mistrust of our intentions in the region. We should be open to provide civilian development assistance with the legitimate Palestinian government and press for the end of settlement development in areas designated for a Palestinian state.

But does the U.S. have the political will to make the tough decision to lead and potentially engage countries that have not been our allies? My assumption is that the Administration will continue to be more concerned about optics and parse language. Congress will scream bloody murder about the President's lack of leadership and engage in partisan fisticuffs over non-essential issues. I am not hopeful at all.

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